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Abstract
It is a classical result that the inner product function cannot be computed by an AC0 circuit [17, 1, 22].
It is conjectured that this holds even if we allow arbitrary preprocessing of each of the two inputs
separately. We prove this conjecture when the preprocessing of one of the inputs is limited to output
n + n/(logω(1) n) bits. Our methods extend to many other functions, including pseudorandom
functions, and imply a (weak but nontrivial) limitation on the power of encoding inputs in low-
complexity cryptography. Finally, under cryptographic assumptions, we relate the question of proving
variants of the main conjecture with the question of learning AC0 under simple input distributions.
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1 Introduction
Can preprocessing help in computation? This question, which arises in several areas of
complexity theory, can be formalized in many ways. We consider the following version:
Suppose that f(x, y) : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is a function hard for AC0. Are there
functions α, β : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}poly(n) such that f(x, y) can be computed from α(x), β(y)
using an AC0 circuit?
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17:2 Limits of Preprocessing
We think of α, β as functions that preprocess the inputs x, y in order to make the
computation of f easier. Alternatively, one can think of α(x) and β(y) as messages sent
simultaneously by two parties to an AC0 referee, whose goal is to compute f(x, y). An
alternative formulation is:
Let F be a collection of hard functions fx : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} indexed by x ∈ {0, 1}n. Is
there a function β : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}poly(n) such that each fx(y) ∈ F can be computed
from β(y) using an AC0 circuit?
The two formulations are equivalent due to the completeness of circuit evaluation: if fx
can be computed efficiently from β(y), then the function f(x, y) = fx(y) can be computed
efficiently from β(y) and the description of the circuit for fx.
A simple example where preprocessing does help is when the function f(x, y) depends
only on the Hamming weights of x and y (e.g., |x| > |y|). Another simple example is any
equivalence relation (e.g., graph isomorphism), where the two parties can send to the referee
canonical representatives of the equivalence class of their respective inputs.
In contrast to the above examples, it is widely believed that for f(x, y) =
∑n
i=1 xiyi
mod 2 (also known as mod-2 inner product) the answer to the above questions is negative.
Following Rothblum [27], we refer to this as the inner product with preprocessing (IPPP)
conjecture. Our main result proves a weak version of the IPPP conjecture, ruling out the
utility of preprocessing when the output of β is short:
I Theorem 1 (Main theorem, informal). Let f be the mod-2 inner product function, or
alternatively any exponentially-secure cryptographic pseudorandom function, and let m =
n+n/(logω(1) n). There are no functions α : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}poly(n) and β : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m
for which f(x, y) can be computed from α(x), β(y) using an AC0 circuit.
Our result is in fact more general, applying to a broad class of other functions, and
ruling out not only AC0 circuits, but also bounded depth circuits of subexponential size. In
particular, it applies to any function with large statistical query dimension [23, 7].
Our main theorem implies a modest but meaningful limitation on the power of prepro-
cessing in low-complexity cryptography. There is a large body of work on minimizing the
complexity of pseudorandom functions (PRFs) [19]; see [9] for a survey. A recent work of
Boneh et al. [10] proposed a relaxed notion of PRF, dubbed “encoded-input PRF”, that
allows an arbitrary polynomial-time encoding of the input. This is motivated by several
applications of low-complexity PRFs for which the relaxed notion suffices. The result of Linial
et al. [24] rules out the existence of PRFs (with better than quasipolynomial security) in the
complexity class AC0. A natural question is whether one can circumvent this impossibility
by encoding the input. We show that such an encoding (if it exists) must have a nontrivial
stretch.
As a final contribution, we relate the question of fully settling variants of the IPPP
conjecture to another wide-open question: learning AC0 under “simple” input distributions,
such as polynomial-time samplable distributions, or uniform distributions over linear sub-
spaces of Fn2 . Under cryptographic assumptions from [6, 10], we show that either (1) the
known quasipolynomial time learning algorithm for AC0 under the uniform distribution [24]
cannot be extended to other simple distributions, even with subexponential time; or (2)
IPPP-style hardness conjectures are true. Put differently, progress on learning AC0 (even
under simple distributions and in subexponential time) would lead to proving IPPP-style
conjectures under cryptographic assumptions. The latter currently seems difficult. The idea
behind this connection is that the functions α and β corresponding to a refutation of an
IPPP-style conjecture define a reduction from breaking “rounded inner-product” style (weak)
PRF candidates to learning AC0 under simple distributions.
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1.1 Related Work
The power of preprocessing is relevant to many problems in computer science. For instance,
the broad goal of data structures is to preprocess x into a polynomially longer ŷ = β(y),
such that queries of the form f(x, y) can be answered by reading few bits of ŷ. In our case,
we replace “reading few bits of ŷ” by “computing an AC0 function of ŷ”. Below we survey
several settings in complexity theory and cryptography that motivate this kind of questions.
Communication complexity – Polynomial hierarchy
Communication complexity contains analogs of the familiar complexity classes of computa-
tional complexity. For example, Pcc consists of all two-party functions which can be computed
by exchanging polylogarithmically many bits, and NPcc consists of all two-party functions
which can be verified using polylogarithmically many bits.
An NPcc protocol for a function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} proceeds as follows: an
oracle sends the two parties the index of a combinatorial rectangle X ×Y ⊆ {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n
on which f = 1, and the two parties verify that their inputs x, y belong to the rectangle:
x ∈ X and y ∈ Y ; the complexity of the protocol is the length of the index. Equivalently,
f ∈ NPcc if it can be written as a disjunction of 2polylog(n) combinatorial rectangles, that is,
functions of the form “x ∈ A and y ∈ B”.
Babai, Frankl and Simon [4] extended this by defining an analog of the polynomial
hierarchy, PHcc. A function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} belongs to PHcc if it can be
expressed as a constant depth circuit of quasipolynomial size 2polylog(n) whose leaves are
combinatorial rectangles. Equivalently, f ∈ PHcc if it can be expressed as a constant depth
circuits of quasipolynomial size whose leaves are arbitrary functions depending arbitrarily on
one of the inputs. This is an instance of our main question, with a slight difference: PHcc
allows the circuits to have quasipolynomial size.
Existing lower bound methods in communication complexity only go as far as PNPcc [20].
Nevertheless, it is a folklore conjecture that the inner product function IP lies outside PHcc.
This is considered as one of the most important outstanding open problems in the field.
Razborov [26] showed that a function whose matrix representation is rigid enough doesn’t
belong to PHcc (see also [35]), thus giving one potential avenue to prove lower bounds against
PHcc. Recently, in a surprising result, Alman and Williams [3] (see also [16]) showed that
the inner product (or Hadamard) matrix isn’t as rigid as was previously believed; however,
their result doesn’t rule out the use of Razborov’s approach for proving the IPPP conjecture.
Communication complexity – Simultaneous messages and compression
As noted above, the question we study can be naturally cast as a computationally bounded
variant of the simultaneous messages (SM) model in communication complexity [36, 5]. In
this model, k ≥ 2 parties send their messages to a referee, who should immediately output
the value of the function. In our case, k = 2 and the referee is limited to be an AC0 circuit.
On the other hand, the two parties are computationally unbounded, and the message sent
by each party can be longer than its input.
A different communication complexity model that considers AC0-bounded parties is the
compression model from [15, 11]. In this model, there is an AC0 party whose goal is to
compute the parity of its n-bit input x using the help of a computationally unbounded party,
while minimizing the communication. This model is very different from ours; in particular,
the model is trivialized if one allows n bits of communication.
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Circuit complexity – Graph complexity
Pudlák, Rödl and Savický [25] developed the concept of graph complexity as a new approach
to circuit lower bounds. Given a graph, we attempt to build it up from “axioms” using union,
intersection, and complementation. In the particular case of bipartite complexity, the graph
to be constructed is bipartite, and the axioms are complete bipartite graphs respecting the
bipartition of the target graph.
A bipartite graph naturally defines a Boolean function with two inputs: the inputs are
one vertex from each side, and the output is whether the edge exists. This correspondence
shows that bipartite complexity is the same as a circuit whose leaves are combinatorial
rectangles. Alternatively, we can allow each leaf to depend arbitrarily on one of the inputs,
thus recovering our model of study.
Bipartite complexity can be studied for various circuit classes. One recent highlight is
the work of Tal [29], in which he shows that bipartite formulas computing IP must have
quadratic size.
Circuit complexity – AC0 ◦ MOD2
Our understanding of AC0[p] circuits lacks compared to AC0 circuits. While we have strong
lower bounds against AC0[p] circuits, the existing correlation bounds are significantly weaker,
and this is a barrier for constructing pseudorandom generators for AC0[p]. Observing all
of this, Servedio and Viola [28] suggest considering a weakening of AC0[2], in which all
parity gates appear in the bottom layer. They conjecture that inner product cannot be
computed by such circuits, and prove their conjecture for depth-3 circuits. Akavia et al. [2]
give cryptographic applications for lower bounds against this class, and Cheragchi et al. [12]
give superlinear lower bounds for inner product.
AC0 circuits with parity gates at the bottom are the same as AC0 circuits with linear
preprocessing, namely where the preprocessing functions α, β are linear over F2. In other
words, the conjecture of Serverdio and Viola is a special case of our conjecture, in which it
suffices to rule out linear α, β.
Cryptography
Our formulation of the IPPP conjecture is a close variant of the IPPP conjecture made
by Rothblum [27], where it was used to construct circuits resilient to AC0 leakage. (The
flavor of IPPP from [27] is different from ours in that it restricts α, β to be polynomial-time
computable and assumes hardness of approximation as opposed to just worst-case hardness.)
In a recent work of Bogdanov et al. [8], a similar result was obtained unconditionally.
As discussed above, our main question is strongly relevant to the goal of implementing
cryptographic primitives in AC0. The work of Boneh et al. [10] poses the question of
implementing an “encoded-input pseudorandom function” in AC0, namely a pseudorandom
function family fk(x), where each function fk can be computed in AC0 given an encoding
of the input x. This is essentially the same as asking whether our main question can be
answered affirmatively for some f(k, x) such that fk(x) is a pseudorandom function family.
Extractors
As part of his study of extractors for NC0 and AC0 sources, Viola [34] constructed a function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} such that the distribution (x, f(x)) (with x uniform) is hard for AC0 to
sample, even approximately. In particular, his results imply that the function F : [n+ 1]×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1} given by
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F (i, y) =
{
yi i ∈ [n],
f(y) i = n+ 1,
cannot be computed by an AC0 circuit from α(x), β(y), where α : [n+ 1]→ {0, 1}poly(n) and
β : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. Therefore F (x, y) requires exactly n+ 1 bits of preprocessing of y.
1.2 Overview of techniques
We outline the technique used for proving Theorem 1. The main tool we use is the LMN
inequality [24, 30], which states that AC0 functions can be approximated by low degree
functions. Let us illustrate the main idea behind the proof by sketching the proof of the
following special case.
I Theorem 2. Let α : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}∗ and let β : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, and suppose that C is
a bounded-depth circuit satisfying C(α(x), β(y)) = IP(x, y) for all x, y ∈ {0, 1}n. Then C has
exponential size.
Since the inner product function is injective in each of its inputs, the preprocessing
function β must be bijective.
For each x ∈ {0, 1}n, we can plug in the values α(x) to obtain constant-depth circuit Cx,
of size at most that of C, satisfying Cx(y) = IP(x, β−1(y)) for all y ∈ {0, 1}n.
For any two x 6= z, the functions fx(y) = IP(x, y) and fz(y) = IP(z, y) are orthogonal
(this is the well-known orthogonality of the Fourier characters). This property is crucially
maintained by the functions Cx, Cz, which are also orthogonal.
Suppose that C has small size. We are thus in the following situation: we have 2n
orthogonal functions Cx, each of which can be approximated by a low degree function
(by LMN), and so close to a low-dimensional subspace x of R[{0, 1}n]. This is, however,
impossible.
The argument works in much the same way for any function f(x, y) which is injective in
its first input and whose “slices” fx(y) = f(x, y) are approximately orthogonal on average.
A short hybrid argument shows that PRFs fit the bill.
It is more challenging to extend the argument to functions β with larger output {0, 1}m.
The basic idea is to complete the functions Cx, which are a priori defined only on 2n of the
2m possible inputs, to total functions which are still approximately orthogonal. Therefore if
C has small size then one of the functions Cx will be far from V . On the other hand, since
Cx agrees with a function computed by an AC0 circuit on a 2n−m fraction of the input, and
that function is close to V . These two properties contradict each other.
This sketch explains why we can only expect to handle this way m = n+ o(n): if m is
any larger, then the correlation of Cx with the output of the circuit is too small, and so we
cannot reach any contradiction.
Organization
After brief preliminaries (Section 2), we state our main results in Section 3, including
Theorem 1 above. The connection to learning AC0 functions under simple input distributions
appears in Section 4. We prove our main technical theorem in Section 5, which is followed
by applications to encoded-input PRFs (Section 6) and rounded inner product (Section 7).
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Definitions and notation
Simultaneous messages protocols
A (two-party) simultaneous messages (SM) protocol consists of two players, which we refer
to as Alice and Bob, and a referee, which we refer to as Carol, that together compute a
function. Alice and Bob each send a message, which is based on the input, to Carol, who
then computes a function of the two messages received. Formally, we have the following
definitions:
I Definition 3 (Simultaneous messages protocols). Let X,Y, X̂, Ŷ , Z be finite nonempty sets.
A simultaneous messages protocol (shortly, SM protocol or SMP) P is a triplet of functions
(A,B,C), where A : X → X̂, B : Y → Ŷ , and C : X̂ × Ŷ → Z. We call C the referee
function.
I Definition 4 (SM protocol admittance). Let f : X × Y → Z be a function. We say that f
admits an SM protocol (A,B,C) if f(x, y) = C(A(x), B(y)) for every (x, y) ∈ X × Y . In
that case, we also say that (A,B,C) computes f .
Inner product space of Boolean functions
For the purpose of utilizing Fourier analysis, we will consider the inner product space of all
functions {−1, 1}n → R with the following inner product:






It is a known fact that the aforementioned inner product space has as orthonormal basis
the set of all parity functions {χS}S⊆[n], defined by χS(x) =
∏
i∈S xi.
The Inner Product function





Note that each x, when fixed, corresponds to a parity function on a subset S of y’s
coordinates, a subset which is determined by x. This correspondence is actually a bijection
mapping elements of {0, 1}n to subsets of 2[n]. Thus, when we switch to ±1 notation, we
can identify each x ∈ {−1, 1}n with the parity function χS(x)(y) that results when fixing x
in IP(x, y).
One-to-one condition
Some functions have a certain property, formally defined below, rendering them harder
to compute with preprocessing. Restricting attention to these functions seems to help in
obtaining lower bounds.
I Definition 5 (One-to-one condition). Let f : X × Y → Z be a function. We say that f
satisfies the left one-to-one condition if for every x 6= x′ ∈ X there exists y ∈ Y such that
f(x, y) 6= f(x′, y). Similarly, we say that f satisfies the right one-to-one condition if for
every y 6= y′ ∈ Y there exists x ∈ X such that f(x, y) 6= f(x, y′). Finally, we say that f
satisfies the one-to-one condition if f satisfies both the left and right one-to-one conditions.
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I Proposition 6 (One-to-one preprocessing). Let f : X × Y → Z be a function. Then:
If f satisfies the left one-to-one condition, then for every SM protocol (A,B,C) that f
admits, A computes a one-to-one mapping.
If f satisfies the right one-to-one condition, then for every SM protocol (A,B,C) that f
admits, B computes a one-to-one mapping.
2.2 Known facts
The following are known facts we will need later.
I Theorem 7 (Tal’s LMN improvement (LMNT) [24, 30]). Let f be a Boolean function with
n variables computable by an unbounded fan-in circuit of depth h and size M , and let t be
any integer. Then,
‖f≥t‖2 ≤ 2 · 2−t/Oh(logM)
h−1
.
I Lemma 8 (Lemma 3.6 in [21]). Let H: [0, 1]→ R be the binary entropy function defined by
H(p) = −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p).






Our main technical result, proved in Section 5, states that a “large” collection of functions
that are “close” to being orthonormal, is computationally hard for SM protocols in which
the referee is an unbounded fan-in circuit of constant depth, and one player is limited to
“short” preprocessing output length.
I Theorem 9 (Main Theorem). Let f : {−1, 1}n×{−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} be a Boolean function,
let 0 ≤ k ≤ n/2− 1, and let 0 ≤ t ≤ n+ k be an integer. Denote fx(y) , f(x, y). Suppose
the following hold:
f satisfies the right one-to-one condition.














f admits an SM protocol P = (A,B,C) such that B : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1}n+k and C is







One may wonder about the necessity of satisfying the one-to-one condition. While it may
still be the case that the same result (or even better) follows without this assumption, if we
could obtain it that way, then we could easily exhibit a function with stronger lower bounds.
As an example, consider taking the inner product function and computing it only on a prefix
of the input while ignoring other bits – relying on the main theorem’s consequence, we could
extend it to an arbitrary Ω(n) lower bound on the preprocessing output length.
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The (somewhat cumbersome) second requirement on a function f : {−1, 1}n×{−1, 1}n →
{−1, 1} specified in Theorem 9 can be replaced by a slightly stronger requirement, yet one
involving the more familiar measure borrowed from the study of learning by statistical quer-
ies [23]. Define the statistical query dimension of f with respect to the uniform distribution to
be the size of the largest set D ⊆ {−1, 1}n such that |〈fx, fx′〉| ≤ 1/|D| for every x 6= x′ ∈ D.
More details on statistical query dimension can be found in [7].
A simple consequence of Theorem 9 is Theorem 1. Here we state a more general version
that refers to statistical query dimension. At a high level, the theorem says that computing
with preprocessing a function having exponential statistical query dimension remains as hard
for AC0 as without, given that one player is limited to output a string whose length stretches
the input length by an additive sublinear term:
I Proposition 10 (Formal version of Theorem 1). Let k = o(n), and suppose that a function
f : {−1, 1}n ×{−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} satisfies the one-to-one condition and has statistical query
dimension of 2Ω(n). If f admits an SM protocol (A,B,C) such that B : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n+k






Proof. Let D ⊆ {−1, 1}n be a set of size 2Ω(n) such that |〈fx, fx′〉| ≤ 1/|D| for every
x 6= x′ ∈ D. One can easily find an 0 < α ≤ 1/2 for which H(α) is small enough, such that
setting t = α(n+ k) gives







13 · 22(k+1) · 2H(α)(n+k) ≤ |D|/6.








































Since IP satisfies the one-to-one condition and has the largest possible statistical query
dimension of 2n, we get the following corollary.
I Corollary 11. Let k ≤ nα for some 0 ≤ α < 1, and suppose that IP admits an SM protocol
(A,B,C) such that B : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n+k and C is an unbounded fan-in circuit of depth h









I Corollary 12. Let k ≤ nlogβ n for every β > 0 (for large enough n), and suppose that IP
admits an SM protocol (A,B,C) such that B : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n+k and C is an unbounded
fan-in circuit of depth h and size M . Then:
M ≥ 2Ωh(log
c n) for every c > 0.
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We now present an application of our main theorem to cryptography. We show that
exponentially secure PRFs (in fact, even weak PRFs) are not computable in AC0, even if one
allows an arbitrary sublinear-stretch encoding of the input. This implies a limitation on the
power of encoded-input PRFs in AC0 [10].
I Definition 13 (pseudorandom functions). Let K be a keys domain, and let F : K×{0, 1}n →
{0, 1} be a family of functions; denote Fk(x) , F (k, x). For integer m and ε ∈ [0, 1], we say
that F is a (strong) (ε,m)-pseudorandom function function family (shortly (ε,m)-PRF) if








Df (1n) = 1
]∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
If the distinguisher is limited to querying the oracle on random and independent inputs, then
we say that F is a weak (ε,m)-PRF.
For simplicity, we will consider the case in which K = {0, 1}n (under the uniform distribution).
We prove the following result in Section 6:
I Theorem 14 (Lower bound for exponentially secure weak PRFs). Let k ≤ nα for some
0 ≤ α < 1, and suppose that F : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is a strong 2Ω(n)-PRF, or
alternatively a weak 2Ω(n)-PRF satisfying the right one-to-one condition. If F admits an SM
protocol (A,B,C) such that B : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n+k and C is an unbounded fan-in circuit of









(Similar results hold for 2nΩ(1) -PRFs, with slightly worse bounds on M .)
As before, the reason we require a weak PRF to satisfy the right one-to-one condition is
that its “effective” input size could be much smaller than n. For example, imagine a weak
PRF which ignores the right half of its input. A distinguisher would need 2Ω(n) random
samples to notice this. The right one-to-one condition is automatically satisfied by strong
PRFs: if fk(x) = fk(x′) for all (or even most) keys k, then it is easy to distinguish fk from a
random function by querying the input function at x, x′.
We prove similar results for a class of functions obtained by applying a “rounding predicate”
to inner-product modulo q.
I Definition 15 (Rounded inner product). For an integer q ≥ 2 and a set R ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , q−1}





i=1 xiyi (mod q) ∈ R,
1 otherwise.
One reason for our interest in this class is that some instances, such as rounded in-
ner product modulo 6, are conjectured to be (weak) pseudorandom functions with near-
exponential security [10]. Under such a conjecture, the desired negative result would follow
from our results on (weak) PRFs. However, the results about rounded inner product functions
are unconditional, and apply also to instances that are provably not (weak) PRFs.
We prove the following result in Section 7:
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I Theorem 16 (Lower bound for rounded inner product). Let q ≥ 2 be even, and let R ⊆
{0, 1, . . . , q−1} such that |R| = q/2. Let k ≤ nα for some 0 ≤ α < 1, and suppose that IP[q,R]
admits an SM protocol (A,B,C) such that B : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n+k and C is an unbounded









4 Conditional Limits of Preprocessing and Learning AC0
We were unable to settle the main IPPP conjecture or prove similar results on the limits of
preprocessing for other explicit functions. Moreover, our current techniques seems insufficient.
A second-best alternative is to settle such questions under widely believed conjectures from
complexity theory or cryptography. While we are also unable to show such a conditional
result (and view this as an interesting goal), we can relate this challenge to another intriguing
question: learning AC0 under “simple” distributions.
The work of Linial et al. [24] shows that AC0 can be learned in quasipolynomial time under
the uniform distribution. It is open whether the same holds for PAC learning under arbitrary
distributions. The question is still open even when restricted to simple input distributions,
such as uniform distributions over linear subspaces of Fn2 , and even if “quasipolynomial” is
relaxed to “subexponential.” In fact, we are not aware of hardness results that apply to any
simple distributions or beyond quasipolynomial time. See [13, 31] for weaker conditional
hardness results, and [14] for a survey of known learning algorithms for AC0.
We observe that positive results on learning AC0 under simple distributions can be
used to base hardness of IPPP-style problems on cryptographic assumptions from [6, 10].
Equivalently, cryptographic assumptions imply that either (1) AC0 cannot be learned under
simple distributions in subexponential time, or (2) IPPP-style hardness conjectures are true.
While both (1) and (2) seem highly plausible, strong versions of them may turn out to be
false. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, neither (1) nor (2) are known to be implied by
standard conjectures in cryptography or complexity theory. A direct proof that either (1)
or (2) hold also seems unlikely. For these reasons, we believe that the above connection is
meaningful, and can potentially lead to future progress on either IPPP-style questions or
learning AC0 under simple distributions.
4.1 The conjectures
We will show connections between the following types of conjectures:
Cryptographic assumptions:
(C1) Subexponential hardness of Learning With Rounding (LWR) [6]: for some ε > 0
and polynomials p = p(n), q = q(n), the function fk(x) = Round(〈k, x〉 (mod 2q)) is a
2Ω(nε)-secure weak PRF, where k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p− 1}n and x ∈ {0, 1}n. Here, Round(y)
returns 0 or 1 depending on whether y is closer to 0 or to the modulus 2q.
(C2) Subexponential hardness of LWR mod 6 [10]: for some ε > 0, fk(x) = Round(〈k, x〉
(mod 6)) is a 2Ω(nε)-secure weak PRF, where k, x ∈ {0, 1}n.
Hardness of learning conjectures:
(L1) AC0 cannot be learned in subexponential time under all polynomial-time samplable
input distributions.
(L2) AC0 cannot be learned in subexponential time under all F2-linear input distribu-
tions.
Here, learning in subexponential time refers to a 2no(1)-time learning algorithm in the
standard PAC model [32].
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IPPP-style conjectures:
(P1) Integer-IP does not admit an SM protocol (A,B,C) where the referee C is in AC0
and the parties A and B are polynomial-time. Here Integer-IP is the (non-boolean)
inner product of two n-bit vectors over the integers.
(P2) Integer-IP is not in AC0 ◦MOD2.
Similarly, we define (P1)m and (P2)m as variants where Integer-IP is replaced by inner
product modulo m. Note that (P1)2 is the worst-case variant of Rothblum’s IPPP
conjecture [27] and (P2)2 is the IPPP with linear preprocessing conjecture made by
Servedio and Viola [28].
4.2 The connections
We now establish simple connections between the previous conjectures.
I Theorem 17. The following implications hold:
1. (C1)⇒ (L1) ∨ (P1)
2. (C1)⇒ (L2) ∨ (P2)
3. (C2)⇒ (L1) ∨ (P1)2 ∨ (P1)3
4. (C2)⇒ (L2) ∨ (P2)2 ∨ (P2)3
Proof. To prove (1), suppose that both (L1) and (P1) are false. We use the SM protocol
implied by ¬(P1) to convert the learning algorithm implied by ¬(L1) into an attack against
the LWR assumption in (C1). Let f(a, b) be the Integer-IP function. By ¬(P1), there is an
SM protocol (A,B,C) for f where C is in AC0 and the parties A and B are polynomial-time.
Letting f ′(k, x) be the rounded inner product function defined by polynomials p, q as in (C1),
we get a similar SM protocol (A′, B′, C ′) for f ′ in the following natural way: A′ expands each
ki ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p− 1} to a binary length-p vector of weight ki and invokes A; B′ expands each
xi ∈ {0, 1} to the length-p vector (xi, . . . , xi) and invokes B; and C ′ invokes C to compute
the integer inner product 〈k, x〉, reduces the result modulo q, and rounds. Since p and q are
polynomials, C ′ can indeed be implemented in AC0. Now consider the message k̂ sent by
A′ on a uniformly random input k, and let C ′
k̂
be the AC0 circuit obtained by restricting
C ′ to this first message. Let X be the (polynomial-time samplable) input distribution
defined by the message sent by B′ on a uniformly random input x. Using the subexponential
time learning algorithm implied by ¬(L1) to learn C ′
k̂
on input distribution X, we get a
subexponential time algorithm breaking (C1) as required.
The proofs of the other parts of the theorem follow similarly, noting that if neither
(P1)2 nor (P1)3 hold (resp., neither (P2)2 nor (P2)3 hold), then f ′ computing rounded inner
product modulo 6 admits an SM protocol with referee in AC0 and polynomial-time parties
(resp., parties computing an F2-linear function with polynomial stretch). J
5 Proof of Main Theorem
The following two results will be needed for proving the main theorem, Theorem 9.
I Proposition 18 (High-degree spectral concentration bound). Let f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1}
be a Boolean function, and let 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1/2. Then, for every integer 0 ≤ t ≤ n such that
‖f≤t‖ ≤ ε, if an unbounded fan-in circuit of depth h and size M agrees with f on at least
1/2 + ε fraction of inputs, then
M ≥ 2Ωh
(
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Proof. Let 0 ≤ t ≤ n be an integer such that ‖f≤t‖ ≤ ε, and suppose that an unbounded
fan-in circuit of depth h and size M computes a function F that agrees with f on at least
1/2 + ε fraction of inputs.
On one hand, we have
〈F, f〉 = 2 Pr[F = f ]− 1 ≥
assumption
2(1/2 + ε)− 1 = 2ε.
On the other hand, we have










2 · 2−t/Oh(logM)h−1 =⇒ M ≥ 2Ωh
(
[ t1−2 log ε ]1/(h−1)
)
. J
In what follows, we will use the following notation:
For a set X, we write i 6= j ∼ X to mean that (i, j) is chosen uniformly at random from
the set {(i, j) ∈ X ×X : i 6= j}.
Given an inner product space V , a subspace U ≤ V , and a vector v ∈ V , we denote the
projection of v onto U by projU (v).
I Lemma 19 (The Projection Lemma). Let V be an inner product space over R. Let
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Put these indices in a set Y , and let W , span({vi : i ∈ Y }).
Let w ∈W such that ‖w‖ ≤ 1, and write w =
∑








Multiply this by ci, and sum over all i ∈ Y to obtain





































i ≤ 2.1 Since (a+ b)2 ≤ 2a2 + 2b2, for every i ∈ Y we have





















































Now let u1, . . . , uD be an orthonormal basis for U , and for every k ∈ [D], let wk ∈W be


































, as desired. J
We can now prove our main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 9. The proof follows several steps.
1 Note that the argument implies that the vectors {vi}i∈Y are linearly independent; otherwise, we can




i is arbitrary large.
CCC 2020
17:14 Limits of Preprocessing
STEP 1: Since f satisfies the left one-to-one condition, by Proposition 6, B computes a one-
to-one mapping; hence, we can extend it to a permutation τ : {−1, 1}n+k → {−1, 1}n+k
as follows:
τ(y1, . . . , yn+k) =
{
B(y1, . . . , yn) if yn+1 = · · · = yn+k = 1,
arbitrary choice otherwise,
where by arbitrary choice we mean one of the (2n+k−2n)! possible ways of completing the
definition so as to yield a permutation. Define σ = τ−1 and note that σ is a permutation
as well.
STEP 2: For every x ∈ {−1, 1}n and R ⊆ {n + 1, . . . , n + k}, define fRx : {−1, 1}n+k →
{−1, 1}n+k by
fRx (y1, . . . , yn+k) =
{
fx(y1, . . . , yn) if yn+1 = · · · = yn+k = 1,
χS(x)(y1, . . . , yn) · χR(yn+1, . . . , yn+k) otherwise.
What can we say about these functions?
Fix x ∈ {−1, 1}n, and denote by Cx the circuit obtained from C when Alice is given x
as input. Now, consider y ∈ {−1, 1}n+k.
If yn+1 = · · · = yn+k = 1, then fRx (y) = fx(y) by definition; hence, by the
correctness of P and the definition of σ, we have that fRx agrees with Cx ◦ σ−1 on
all such y’s.
Otherwise, let i ∈ {n + 1, . . . , n + k} such that yi = −1. For every R ⊆ {n +
1, . . . , n + k} that contains i, we have that Cx ◦ σ−1 agrees with exactly one of
fRx , f
R\{i}
x on the input (y1, . . . , yn+i−1,−1, yn+i+1, . . . , yn+k); thus, for exactly half




fRx (y) = Cx(σ−1(y))
]
= 12 .







[fRx (y) = Cx(σ−1(y))]
]
= 12 ,





fR(x)x (y) = Cx(σ−1(y))
]
≥ 12 ,
It follows that the fraction of inputs on which fR(x)x and Cx ◦ σ−1 agree is at least









which is also the fraction of inputs on which FR(x)x , fR(x)x ◦ σ and Cx agree.
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χR(x)(z) · χR(x′)(z) · 〈χS(x), χS(x′)〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
·2−k





















STEP 3: Let V be the inner product space of all functions {−1, 1}n+k → R, and let U ≤ V

















∥∥∥∥FR(x∗)x∗ ≤t∥∥∥∥ ≤ 12k+1 .
Since
∥∥∥∥FR(x∗)x∗ ≤t∥∥∥∥ ≤ 12k+1 and Cx∗ is an unbounded fan-in circuit of depth h and size
≤M that agrees with FR(x
∗)
x∗ on at least 12 +
1
















6 Encoded-input pseudorandom functions
The goal of this section is to prove Theorem 14, which shows that weak PRFs are hard for
our model.
I Proposition 20 (Expected inner product bound for weak PRFs). Let δ ∈ (0, 1], and suppose
that F : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is a weak (m, 1m )-PRF for m = Ω
(










Proof. We switch notation to F : {−1, 1}n×{−1, 1}n → {−1, 1}. The proof follows a hybrid
argument.
Consider the following algorithm M(f, g) which is given access to a pair of functions f, g
and operates as follows:
1. M chooses uniformly and independently N = 32(1/δ)2 ln(4/δ) random inputs ~x =
(x(1), . . . ,x(N)).
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3. M outputs 1 if θ̂
2
> δ/2, and 0 otherwise.
Suppose that f, g are randomly chosen. Denote Zi = f(x(i))g(x(i)) for every i ∈ [N ],
and Z =
∑
i∈[N ]Zi. We have Ef ,g[Zi] = 0 for every i ∈ [N ], implying Ef ,g[Z] = 0.2 Thus,
Pr
f ,g
[M(f , g) = 1] = Pr
f ,g
[∣∣θ̂∣∣ >√δ/2] = Pr[|Z − E[Z]| > N√δ/2] ≤
Hoeffding
2e−Nδ/4.
To establish the hybrid argument, we define two distinguishers:
Algorithm Af (1n): runs M(f, g), where g is chosen uniformly at random by A. This
means that whenever M wishes to access g, A chooses a random answer and passes it to
M ; to be consistent, A records past answers.
Algorithm Bg(1n): runs M(Fk′ , g), where k′ is chosen uniformly at random by B. This
means that B draws k′ once at the beginning, and that F is accessible.
Observe that Prk[AFk(1n) = 1] = Prg[Bg(1n) = 1]. Thus,∣∣∣Pr
f ,g
[M(f , g) = 1]− Pr
k,k′





















Both Af and Bg require circuits of size m = O(Nn) = O
(





[M(f , g) = 1]− Pr
k,k′
[M(Fk, Fk′) = 1]




[M(Fk, Fk′) = 1] ≤ Pr
f ,g
[M(f , g) = 1] + 2N ≤ 2e
−Nδ/4 + 2N .
Consider now running M(Fk, Fk′) with k,k′ chosen uniformly at random.






≤ 2e−Nδ/4 + 2N .
Applying Hoeffding’s inequality once more,
Pr
k,k′
[∣∣∣θ̂2 − 〈Fk, Fk′〉2∣∣∣ > δ/2] = Pr
k,k′




[∣∣θ̂ − 〈Fk, Fk′〉∣∣ > δ/4]
≤ 2e−Nδ
2/32.
2 To ease notation, we shall omit references to ~x when writing probabilities and expectations, yet we
should keep in mind that these are taken with respect to the random choice of ~x as well.














































∣∣∣ 〈Fk, Fk′〉2 > δ] · Pr
k,k′
[






∣∣∣ 〈Fk, Fk′〉2 ≤ δ] · Pr
k,k′
[
〈Fk, Fk′〉2 ≤ δ
]
≤ 1 · (4e−Nδ
2/32 + 2N ) + δ · 1
= δ + 4e−Nδ
2/32 + 2N
≤ 2δ + 2δ = 4δ,
the last inequality holding since N = 32(1/δ)2 ln(4/δ) ≥ 1/δ. J
I Proposition 21 (General lower bound for weak PRFs). There exist a constant 0 < a ≤ 1/2
such that for every 0 ≤ r ≤ n/2 − 1 and integer 0 ≤ t ≤ a(n + r) the following holds: If















and F admits an SM protocol (A,B,C) such that B : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n+r and C is an






Proof. Let us define:




























Thus, assuming m = Ω
(
(1/δ)2 ln(4/δ) · n
)






≤ 4δ = 2
2r
36s2 .
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We need to justify why s ≤ 2n. As shown in the proof of Proposition 10, there exists
0 < a ≤ 1/2 such that












Theorem 14 is an immediate corollary.
7 Rounded inner product
In this section we prove Theorem 16, an IPPP-style theorem (with sublinear stretch) for a
class of functions obtained by applying a “rounding predicate” to an inner product modulo q.
We remind the reader that these functions are given in Definition 15.
The following proposition will be useful.
I Proposition 22 (Inner product convergence). Let q ≥ 2 be an integer. Then, for every
























Proof. For the finite state space Q = {0, . . . , q − 1} of remainders modulo q, we define a
sequence of random variables Z0,Z1, . . . ,Zn by
Zi =
{
0 i = 0,
Zi−1 + xiyi (mod q) i ∈ [n],
where (x,y) ∼ {0, 1}2n. We are interested in limn→∞ Pr[Zn = r | Z0 = 0] . For every
i ∈ [n], we have
Pr[Zi | Zi−1] = Pr[Zi | Zi−1, . . . ,Z0],
and for every i ∈ [n] and u ∈ Q, we have
Pr[Zi = u | Zi−1 = u] = 3/4,
Pr[Zi = u+ 1 (mod q) | Zi−1 = u] = 1/4.
Thus, the sequence (Zi) forms a Markov chain, which we claim is ergodic. To see that,
consider a walk of q steps; then, for every u, v ∈ Q, we have Pr[Zi+q = u | Zi = v] ≥ ( 14 )
q > 0.
Since (Zi) is a finite ergodic Markov chain, it follows that there exists a unique stationary





is monotone on [0, a(n + r)].
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distribution π over Q such that for every r ∈ Q, we have limn→∞ Pr[Zn = r | Z0 = 0] = π(r).
It is easy to verify that π∗ = ( 1q , . . . ,
1
q ) is a distribution over Q which satisfies π
∗ = π∗P ,
where P is the transition matrix of the Markov chain, given by
P =

3/4 1/4 0 . . . 0
0 3/4 1/4 . . . 0






1/4 0 0 . . . 3/4
 .
















The second part of the claim follows from known properties of convergence to a stationary
distribution. J
We are now ready to prove the lower bound for computing rounded inner products in our
setting.
Proof of Theorem 16. Let y, z ∈ {0, 1}n be such that the Hamming distance between y
and z is at least n/3, and let Sy and Sz be the subsets of [n] characterized by y and z,
respectively. Without loss of generality, we may assume that |Sy \ Sz| ≥ n/6, and let us
denote J , Sy \ Sz.









and observe that av, bv are also fixed. We have
n∑
i=1














xizi (mod q) =
∑
i∈[n]\J
vizi (mod q) = bv (mod q).
It follows that there exists a subset Rv ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} of size q/2 such that
IP[q,R]((u, v), y) = IP[q,R]((u, v), z) ⇐⇒
∑
i∈J
ui (mod q) ∈ Rv.
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Considering IP[q,R](x, y) and IP[q,R](x, z) as functions of x, and switching to {0, 1}n → {−1, 1}
notation, we get〈





IP[q,R](x, y) = IP[q,R](x, z)
]
− 1 = ±O(cn).
Finally, we have:
IP[q,R] satisfies the right one-to-one condition.
The Gilbert–Varshamov bound [18, 33] tells us there exists C ⊆ {0, 1}n of size 2Ω(n)
and minimal Hamming distance n/3. By the analysis above, there exists a constant




log(1/c)n}, and let 0 < α ≤ 1/2 be such that H(α) is small enough so
setting t = α(n+ k) gives us














|X| ≤ 16K 2







≤ K2c2n ≤ 136|X|2 ≤
22k
36|X|2 .
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